Manufacturing Supply Chain Concentration Risk Resolution

A sample decision. Northwind Instruments is a fictional company — this document was generated end-to-end by the Uncoiling method with five invited perspectives.

Decision Story · August 1, 2026

This document was prepared using the Uncoiling decision method. It is a working draft — review it, reshape it for your audience, and make it yours before sharing.

1. Introduction

The organization faces a manufacturing concentration crisis that has been steadily compressing margins and now threatens its most important customer relationship. Approximately 70% of production runs through a single contract manufacturer (CM) in Shenzhen, and two rounds of Section 301 tariffs in eighteen months have eroded already-thin margins with no structural relief in sight. The situation has now reached a forcing function: the largest broadcast customer, representing roughly $25 million — approximately 14% of total revenue — has signaled it will seek alternative suppliers unless lead times drop below three weeks. The current Shenzhen operation delivers in nine to eleven weeks on a good day. The leadership team is presenting this recommendation to the board in the near term.

This document recommends the US Domestic Line — establishing a domestic production facility in one of three assessed metro areas (Research Triangle, Nashville, or the Phoenix corridor). This path eliminates Section 301 tariff exposure structurally, removes compounding regulatory risk associated with nearshore alternatives, and builds a durable, resilient manufacturing footprint for the long term. It is the right destination. It is, however, capital-intensive and timeline-demanding, and the recommendation carries a clear condition: a board-ready bridge package must be in hand before the recommendation is formally presented.

Three other paths were seriously evaluated before arriving here: Stay and Harden — maintaining Shenzhen while pursuing tariff mitigation and near-term buffer stock; Mexico Nearshore — transitioning flagship stock-keeping unit (SKU) production to a Monterrey CM under United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) duty elimination; and Dual-Source Bridge — running Mexico and Shenzhen simultaneously as a deliberate two-geography interim strategy. Each carried genuine merit; each was set aside for reasons this document addresses directly.

This decision was reached provisionally — a deliberate call made with one load-bearing unknown still open: Whether a Mexico manufacturing move would pass a DFARS country-of-origin compliance review for the DoD distributor — specifically whether the account would survive the review intact, require contract modification, or be structurally disqualifying. (which bears on "Sam has flagged that the DoD distributor's supplier change notification clause references manufacturing country of origin specifically, and a Mexico move may trigger a DFARS compliance review that is not merely procedural."). It should be revisited if what is learned there differs materially from what was assumed here.

2. The Most Significant Factors to Consider

What follows are the most significant factors to consider in making this decision.

Compounding regulatory and compliance exposure on the Mexico path — The Mexico path faces not one regulatory exposure but three that compound on each other and all mature inside the same 24-month window

2.1 Customer requalification and compliance triggers make any geography change a mandatory external event

2.2 The tariff environment is structurally unfavorable in both directions

2.3 Capital requirements vary 4-5x across paths with distinct model vulnerabilities

Other significant factors

2.4 Landed cost and margin erosion are the primary financial test

2.5 The broadcast customer's three-week lead time requirement is a hard program constraint with a two-quarter forcing function

2.6 Single-CM concentration creates catastrophic operational exposure

2.7 Workforce reality constrains both nearshore and domestic paths

2.8 Execution bandwidth is a hard constraint

The complete factor analysis is provided in Appendix B.

3. The Recommended Path

The recommended path is to establish a domestic production facility in one of the three assessed metro areas — eliminating Section 301 tariff exposure structurally, removing the compounding regulatory cliff risk on the Mexico path, and building a manufacturing footprint that holds its value regardless of how trade policy evolves over the next decade. The decision was not unanimous among the perspectives invited into this process, and the divergence was substantive enough to deserve a direct account.

Finance and People both pressed hardest for Mexico Nearshore, and the argument was serious: $4–6M in capital, a faster ramp, and a tariff solution that works if the regulatory picture holds. Operations pushed back from a different angle, favoring the current footprint on the grounds that execution bandwidth is already strained and the two-quarter customer forcing function makes any new-facility path difficult to defend without a credible bridge. Legal and Trade landed on the Dual-Source Bridge, precisely because they weighted tariff and regulatory durability highest and were not willing to let the unresolved Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement analysis, the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement regional value content threshold threading at 58–62% against a 60% floor, and the 2026 joint review all mature inside the same payback window on a $4– 6M commitment. Sales aligned with the domestic line on lead time credibility and speed to value. The owner's read, after working through all of it, did not move — and the reason is the pivotal theme that the scoring confirmed: the Mexico path does not face one regulatory exposure; it faces three that compound on each other and all arrive inside the window where the capital decision is still being recovered. That is not a risk that resolves by threading the needle more carefully — it is structural, and the domestic line removes it structurally.

The tradeoffs are real. The capital range of $12–18M is three times the Mexico commitment, the payback model does not close inside five years at current volumes without flagship customer expansion or pricing power not yet in hand, and the 18–24 month workforce ramp is genuinely incompatible with the two-quarter customer urgency unless the bridge package — buffer stock specification, milestone-backed customer roadmap with a production ship date, lease shortlist, and a closed capital range — is complete before the board meeting. For this to work, those four deliverables have to be in hand, not in progress.

4. Options Considered

Other options considered include:

4.1 Stay and Harden

Stay and Harden keeps all production in Shenzhen, pairs tariff mitigation work — Harmonized Tariff Schedule reclassification, duty drawback pursuit, and a Nashville third-party logistics buffer — with a milestone-backed customer roadmap to address the broadcast account's two-quarter lead time requirement without any new capital commitment or manufacturing geography. The operations perspective pressed hardest for this path, weighting execution feasibility and near-term lead time credibility above all else, and the concern was legitimate: the team's bandwidth is genuinely constrained, and adding a new geography risks quality or transition failures on both tracks simultaneously. Ultimately, though, Stay and Harden addresses symptoms rather than the structural exposure — Section 301 tariffs in the current environment show no sign of self-correcting, HTS reclassification and drawback are incremental mitigants rather than durable solutions, and the broadcast customer's urgency is better served by a credible production ship date from a domestic line than by a buffer stock that runs dry without a long-term answer behind it.

4.2 Mexico Nearshore

Mexico Nearshore would transition flagship stock-keeping unit production to a Monterrey contract manufacturer, targeting elimination of Section 301 duties through United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement qualification, at a capital cost of four to six million dollars covering tooling, line qualification, and dual-production overlap. Finance and the people perspective both leaned toward this path, with finance emphasizing capital efficiency and the faster payback relative to the domestic line, and the people perspective pointing to its more manageable workforce standup compared to a greenfield or retrofit domestic facility. The recommendation moved past it because the Mexico path carries three compounding regulatory exposures — Regional Value Content qualification that threads a narrow needle, the 2026 USMCA joint review whose outcome is unknown inside the payback window, and an unresolved Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement country-of-origin question that leaves the Department of Defense distributor account in limbo — and a successful Monterrey ramp creates institutional inertia that risks the company arriving eighteen months later in similar tariff exposure with a new geography layered on top rather than a durable domestic foundation beneath it.

4.3 US Domestic Line

The US Domestic Line would establish a production facility — greenfield or retrofit — in one of the three assessed metro areas (Research Triangle, Nashville, or the Phoenix corridor), eliminating Section 301 exposure entirely on US-sold units and removing DFARS and USMCA regulatory cliff risk from the picture. The sales perspective aligned here, weighting lead time credibility and speed to value most heavily and seeing a domestic production address as the strongest long-term signal to the broadcast customer and the Department of Defense distributor alike; the owner's own read landed in the same place on every weighted criterion after considering all perspectives. This is the recommended path precisely because it is structurally durable rather than mitigation-dependent: the capital commitment of twelve to eighteen million dollars — with eighteen million dollars the honest number once workforce standup costs are included per Marcus's assessment — is real, and the eighteen-to-twenty-four-month ramp is structurally incompatible with the two-quarter customer forcing function without a parallel bridge package, but those tradeoffs are manageable with the specified four-week deliverables (buffer stock specification, milestone-backed customer roadmap, lease shortlist, and a closed capital range) in hand before the board meeting.

4.4 Dual-Source Bridge

The Dual-Source Bridge runs Mexico nearshore and Shenzhen production simultaneously as a deliberate two-geography strategy — Monterrey for flagship units, Shenzhen for the measurement line and tail stock-keeping units — designed to show the broadcast customer credible near-term lead time movement while winding down Shenzhen at a controlled pace, at a capital cost of four to five million dollars plus higher per-unit costs from lost scale. The legal and trade perspective leaned most strongly toward this option, reasoning that demonstrating geographic diversification quickly was the most direct answer to the customer compliance and tariff durability concerns, and that argument deserves credit: the dual-source structure does move faster than the domestic line and does show the customer a concrete change. The recommendation rejected it nonetheless because running two geographies simultaneously demands an external program manager who requires sixty to ninety days to become effective, stretches Marcus's and Teresa's bandwidth across two transition tracks at once, and still leaves the company exposed to every Mexico regulatory uncertainty — USMCA Regional Value Content, the 2026 joint review, and the unresolved DFARS question — without the structural finality that makes the domestic line worth its greater capital commitment.

5. Next Steps

If aligned, this recommendation would be executed as follows:

5.1 Secure board approval — the decision-maker and Dana to socialize the domestic line direction with independent directors by week five, with the full integrated package in hand, so the board meeting at week six is a decision session, not a discovery session; the decision-maker is the single accountable person for this conversation landing cleanly

5.2 Close the bridge package by week three — Marcus to finalize the buffer stock specification and convert his two in-motion Nashville third-party logistics conversations into a written shortlist with capacity, cost, and lead-time terms; output is a board-ready buffer stock plan that covers the production gap during the 18-24 month domestic ramp; Marcus is owner and sole accountable

5.3 Deliver the Hartwell milestone roadmap by week three — Priya to conduct the formal customer conversation without the decision-maker or Marcus present, agree a milestone-backed production ship date, and define the contingency trigger that governs what happens if the domestic line timeline slips; output is a written roadmap Priya can defend in the board pre-read; Priya is owner and sole accountable

5.4 Close the capital range and site shortlist by week three — Dana to set the financial guardrails and deliver a revised capital range that closes the lower end of the $12-18M preliminary estimate, with Marcus validating operational assumptions on retrofit versus greenfield; output is a site shortlist and a defensible payback model for the board package; Dana is owner, Marcus is operational counterpart

5.5 Deliver Alex's workforce plan by week three — Alex to produce a hiring plan with wage benchmarking against defense and aerospace competition, a ramp timeline mapped to the 18-24 month production window, and identification of any external program manager candidates to relieve bandwidth strain on Marcus and Teresa during the Shenzhen wind-down; Alex is owner and sole accountable; this is the highest-nervousness workstream and lateness here breaks integration

5.6 Deliver Sam's regulatory close-out memo by week three — Sam to produce a written DFARS analysis and an RVC stress-test for the Mexico contingency scenario, using his preliminary Harmonized Tariff Schedule read from the second tariff round as the baseline rather than starting from scratch; output must be in writing before the board meeting, not after; Sam is owner and sole accountable

5.7 Integrate all workstream outputs in week four — the decision-maker to lead a single integration session with all five workstream owners, resolve any conflicts between the capital model, the workforce ramp timeline, and the Hartwell milestone roadmap, and produce the board pre-read package; if any of the four bridge legs — buffer stock spec, milestone roadmap, lease shortlist, and closed capital range — is missing at this session, the board meeting date must be reassessed rather than a partial package presented

5.8 Manage Shenzhen wind-down in parallel without quality or transition risk — Marcus and Teresa are bandwidth-constrained across both tracks; the external program manager hire identified in Alex's workforce plan must be initiated no later than week two so the 60-90 day ramp begins immediately; the decision-maker is accountable for ensuring this hire does not slip while bridge package work consumes Marcus's attention

Appendix A: Pivotal Factor Analysis

A.1 Compounding regulatory and compliance exposure on the Mexico path

The Mexico path faces not one regulatory exposure but three that compound on each other and all mature inside the same 24-month window: USMCA RVC qualification that is currently threading a needle at 58-62% against a 60% threshold, a 2026 joint review that has explicitly flagged electronics with Chinese-origin components, and a DFARS compliance review for the DoD distributor that Sam has not yet resolved. Any one of these is manageable; all three arriving inside the payback window of a $4-6M capital commitment — while the financial model has not yet been stress-tested against losing USMCA qualification — means the Mexico path may be solving the tariff problem on paper while building a different version of the same regulatory cliff. The capital decision and the regulatory risk assessments are genuinely inseparable here, and the board cannot approve a Mexico-heavy path while Sam's DFARS analysis remains open.

Given that the Mexico path's financial attractiveness rests on USMCA duty elimination that is currently marginal in compliance headroom, faces a scheduled review that targets exactly this product configuration, and carries an unresolved DFARS exposure that could cost a $10-13M government-adjacent account, the Mexico option's true risk-adjusted cost has not yet been established and cannot be presented to the board as a viable path until both Sam's DFARS analysis and a downside stress-test of the RVC qualification scenario are complete.

Appendix B: Factor Analysis

B.1 Landed cost and margin erosion are the primary financial test — current gross margins on flagship SKUs have fallen from ~48% to 38-42% due to Section 301 tariffs, and the full spread across options is not yet finalized pending HTS verification and RVC qualification analysis.

Before the first tariff hit, flagship SKU gross margins ran approximately 48%. Two rounds of Section 301 duties over eighteen months — sitting at 25% on the relevant HTS codes, with potential 50% exposure on PCB assemblies with significant semiconductor content pending Sam's classification review — have compressed margins to 38-42%. The company absorbed a portion of this rather than passing it through fully to protect the broadcast customer relationship, meaning the true cost of the current path is higher than the P&L reflects cleanly. A 6% price increase was pushed through eighteen months ago; returning for another increase without also delivering lead time improvement is a difficult conversation with a sophisticated buyer who knows the company's cost structure. Dana's preliminary landed cost models across the four paths are directional, not final, and the Mexico option's attractiveness depends materially on RVC qualification and USMCA duty elimination that has not yet been confirmed.

No path can be responsibly recommended until Dana's team completes the landed cost model with current HTS rates verified by Sam — particularly for PCB assembly classifications — because the spread between options, and the true cost of staying on the current path, may be materially different from what was presented to the board last quarter.

B.2 The broadcast customer's three-week lead time requirement is a hard program constraint with a two-quarter forcing function — formal dual-vendor qualification begins in roughly six months and is very difficult to reverse once opened.

The three-week requirement was communicated directly by the customer's VP of Supply Chain to Priya — it is a program constraint tied to delivery windows the customer must commit to their own end clients, not a negotiating position. The customer represents approximately 14% of revenue (~$25M) and is a reference account whose loss would signal delivery unreliability to the broader broadcast segment. Current Shenzhen lead times run nine to eleven weeks on a good day. Priya's estimate is six to nine months before a formal dual-vendor qualification process opens; once opened, it is very difficult to close. An interim buffer stock strategy — four to six weeks of safety stock at a Nashville 3PL — could bridge the lead time gap without changing manufacturing footprint, but depends on demand signal clarity that does not yet exist for this customer's new program. Air freight has been used before at 8-12 margin points per shipment and is not sustainable. What the customer has indicated they would accept is a written roadmap with credible milestones showing a decision has been made and execution is underway.

Any recommended path must either credibly close the lead time gap within approximately two quarters, or include a specific customer communication strategy — a milestone-backed roadmap — that buys time while the structural solution is built. The board recommendation and the customer conversation are linked: the decision the board approves is also the foundation of what Priya brings to that account.

B.3 Customer requalification and compliance triggers make any geography change a mandatory external event — the broadcast customer faces an 8-12 week vendor audit, and the DoD distributor faces a potential DFARS country-of-origin review that could be structurally disqualifying for that account.

Any production site change triggers the broadcast customer's approved vendor list process — an 8-12 week internal qualification cycle that is mandatory once notification is made, and notification is required because the product carries certification marks tied to manufacturing location in the filing. This event lands inside the same six-to-nine month window already under pressure from the lead time ultimatum. Framed poorly, a transition announcement reads as instability rather than improvement and could accelerate the dual-vendor evaluation the company is trying to prevent. Beyond the broadcast customer, Sam has flagged that two government-adjacent accounts — a DoD-qualified distributor (~6-7% of revenue, $10-13M) and a federal systems integrator — have supplier change notification requirements in their purchase agreements. The DoD distributor's clause references manufacturing country of origin specifically, and a Mexico move may trigger a DFARS compliance review that is not merely procedural. Sam's analysis of this exposure is a blocking question that has not yet been fully completed.

Any path involving a new manufacturing geography must be evaluated not just for its own execution feasibility but for the customer compliance events it triggers — sequencing and communication strategy are as important as the manufacturing decision itself. Sam's DFARS analysis must be completed before any Mexico-heavy path can be responsibly recommended to the board.

B.4 The tariff environment is structurally unfavorable in both directions — Section 301 relief has no credible 24-month timeline, and the Mexico path sits on a regulatory ledge given 58-62% RVC straddling the 60% USMCA threshold ahead of the 2026 joint review.

Sam's read is that Section 301 relief on relevant product categories has no credible timeline in the next 24 months — the USTR exclusion process has been unfavorable (two applications denied), and the political environment for reducing China tariffs on electronics is close to zero regardless of election outcome. On the Mexico side, USMCA is up for joint review in July 2026, with electronics carrying Chinese-origin components explicitly flagged as an area of heightened scrutiny. The company's PCB assemblies — sourced from two Shenzhen suppliers representing approximately 38% of flagship BOM cost — currently qualify under a transformation calculation that lands at 58-62% RVC depending on the SKU, against a threshold that currently sits at 60%. The margin of compliance is narrow enough that even a modest tightening of RVC thresholds, or a harder CBP interpretation of transformation calculations for electronics sub-assemblies, could eliminate USMCA qualification on the very products moved to Mexico to shelter from tariffs. Sam's framing — "jumping from one regulatory cliff to stand on a ledge" — captures the asymmetry: Shenzhen stays bad with no relief path, Mexico is better today but carries non-trivial forward regulatory risk inside the 24-month decision window.

No option can assume a stable tariff baseline. The Stay and Harden path faces continued and potentially worsening Section 301 exposure. The Mexico path reduces tariff burden today but the financial model must be stress-tested against a scenario where USMCA qualification is lost or degraded after the 2026 review — which would land inside the payback window of the capital investment.

B.5 Single-CM concentration creates catastrophic operational exposure — a hard break from the Shenzhen CM would cost six to nine months of production disruption, with tooling, jigs, and institutional knowledge embedded in a relationship we do not fully control.

Approximately 70% of production sits with a single Shenzhen CM. During the COVID port disruptions of 2021-2022, the company experienced two instances of six to eight week production outages and nearly lost the broadcast customer relationship the first time. The CM holds proprietary tooling, jigs, line qualifications, and non-standard test fixtures — particularly on the measurement product line — that cannot be quickly replicated elsewhere. Marcus estimates a hard break from this CM, for any reason, would cost six to nine months of production disruption on the measurement line even with an alternative facility identified and ready to onboard. Beyond near-term disruption risk, the geopolitical tail — a Taiwan Strait escalation scenario — carries enough probability and consequence that it belongs in the board risk map. The concentration risk is structurally distinct from tariff exposure and lead time: it is an operational resilience question that persists regardless of tariff policy and affects every path except Dual-Source, which is specifically designed to address it.

The current manufacturing footprint is not just cost-inefficient — it is operationally fragile in ways that have already materialized once and carry tail risks significant enough to warrant board-level visibility. Any path that does not meaningfully reduce single-CM concentration leaves this exposure unaddressed, and that exposure should be visible in the board recommendation regardless of which path is chosen.

B.6 Workforce reality constrains both nearshore and domestic paths — structural turnover in Mexico creates recurring requalification cycles for a precision product, and the US lacks skilled electronics assembly labor at scale with an 18-24 month hiring horizon.

On the domestic side, Alex's assessment of three target metro areas — Research Triangle, greater Nashville, and the Phoenix corridor — found that skilled electronics assembly at the level the flagship SKUs require does not exist at scale in any of those markets. Fine-pitch SMT work, calibration-heavy final assembly, and RF characterization steps are not entry-level positions, and the company competes against defense and aerospace employers for the same limited talent pool at wage levels a $180M company cannot consistently win. Alex's estimate is 18-24 months to hire and train a production crew capable of hitting quality specs, assuming candidates can be found at all. On the Mexico side, Marcus's site visits to two Monterrey CMs found 30-40% annual turnover at the operator level — broadly consistent with maquiladora sector norms of roughly 26% annually — which for a precision product requiring requalification whenever process or operator classifications change translates to a requalification cycle approximately every 12-18 months. Each cycle carries cost and customer notification implications, particularly for broadcast clients with their own validation requirements.

Workforce is a first-order execution constraint on both alternative geographies, not a footnote. The domestic path's 18-24 month hiring horizon is structurally incompatible with the two-quarter customer forcing function. The Mexico path's turnover dynamic creates a recurring quality and requalification burden that must be priced into the total cost of ownership model, not just the initial transition cost.

B.7 Capital requirements vary 4-5x across paths with distinct model vulnerabilities — from $2-3M working capital for Stay and Harden to $12-18M for a domestic line, and each path's financial model is sensitive to the specific uncertainties already surfaced.

Stay and Harden requires the lowest upfront commitment — $2-3M in working capital for flagship-only safety stock plus tariff engineering costs — but carries hidden cost in inventory obsolescence risk on the tail of the portfolio and ongoing margin drag from Section 301 duties. Mexico runs $4-6M all-in including tooling, line qualification, transition costs, and dual-production overlap, with a financial model sensitive to both RVC qualification and tariff assumption in the same direction. The domestic line dominates the capital conversation at $12-18M — Marcus considers $18M the honest number once workforce standup costs are included — and Dana's payback model does not close inside five years at current volumes without material flagship customer expansion or pricing power the company does not currently have. Dual-source compounds execution risk across two simultaneous moves at $4-5M plus higher per-unit costs from lost scale at either location; the board will ask what optionality is worth relative to simply committing to one geography. Labor cost differentials are real and material: US production labor runs roughly $25/hour fully burdened against Mexican maquiladora wages that are substantially lower, which is the mechanism driving IRR sensitivity on the domestic option.

Dana's IRR analysis must be stress-tested against downside assumptions for each path — not just base case — because the paths most attractive on base-case assumptions are precisely those whose models are most sensitive to the uncertainties already surfaced: RVC qualification, demand growth, and pricing power. The capital decision and the regulatory/workforce risk assessments are not separable.

B.8 Execution bandwidth is a hard constraint — the operations team has approximately one and a half qualified transition leads, making any path requiring simultaneous major workstreams dependent on an external program manager hire with its own cost and ramp delay.

Marcus Reed is the primary operations owner for any transition, with Teresa Vang as his sole qualified lieutenant — she has line management experience from Marcus's prior company and could own a Monterrey ramp as her primary responsibility. The constraint is that Teresa currently runs supplier quality on the Shenzhen relationship, meaning a transition would require her to manage both simultaneously, which is precisely the condition under which transitions go sideways. Below Teresa, two manufacturing engineers are solid on process but have never owned a site-level CM relationship and cannot independently lead a workstream. Any path requiring simultaneous major workstreams — Shenzhen wind-down plus new geography ramp — almost certainly requires an external program manager hire. That hire adds cost, and the person will not be effective immediately, introducing a ramp delay at the moment execution pressure is highest. The Teresa Vang constraint is the specific binding resource: she is simultaneously the most capable person for a new geography ramp and the person holding the Shenzhen quality relationship together during wind-down.

Practically, the operations team can run one major transition workstream well or two workstreams poorly. Any path that requires simultaneous execution tracks — and both Mexico and domestic do — must either accept meaningful quality or transition risk on one of them, or budget for an external program manager hire and the 60-90 day ramp before that person is effective.

Appendix C: Decision Scoring Matrix

Scores are 1–5 per criterion; Total is rank-weighted (higher-ranked criteria carry more weight). The highlighted row is the highest-scoring option.

Option	Tariff and re…	Lead time cre…	Customer comp…	Capital effic…	Execution fea…	Concentration…	Speed to value	Total
Stay and Harden	1	1	2	4	5	1	4	**60**
Mexico Nearshore	3	3	4	3	3	2	2	**86**
US Domestic Line	5	4	5	1	1	4	1	**100**
Dual-Source Bridge	4	2	3	2	2	5	3	**82**

Appendix D: How Each Perspective Weighed and Scored

For transparency, this appendix shows the underlying team input — each perspective's own criteria weighting and raw scores, and how the options rank by each perspective's own lights. It is the record, not the decision; the decision is the owner's reconciled result.

Option	Finance	Operations	Sales	Legal & Trade	People	Group average	Reconciled (decision)
Stay and Harden	87	**103**	62	84	92	85.6	60
Mexico Nearshore	**106**	79	70	80	**99**	86.8	86
US Domestic Line	77	65	**103**	83	73	80.2	**100**

Option	Finance	Operations	Sales	Legal & Trade	People	Group average	Reconciled (decision)
Dual-Source Bridge	91	82	82	**100**	83	**87.6**	82

Each perspective column is that perspective's own rank-weighted total (their raw 1–5 scores weighted by their own criteria order); bold marks each column's top option. Group average is the average of the perspectives' own-weighted results — shown for transparency, not the decision. The Reconciled column is the decision-of-record, from the owner's reconciled scores and ranking (it matches the Decision Scoring Matrix appendix).

D.1 The Finance perspective

Their weighting (their own order): Capital efficiency and financial model robustness ×7 · Tariff and regulatory durability ×6 · Speed to value ×5 · Customer compliance manageability ×4 · Concentration risk reduction ×3 · Lead time credibility within the two-quarter window ×2 · Execution feasibility given bandwidth constraints ×1

Option	Capital effic…	Tariff and re…	Speed to value	Customer comp…	Concentration…	Lead time cre…	Execution fea…	Their total
Stay and Harden	4	2	5	2	1	3	5	**87**
Mexico Nearshore	5	4	3	4	3	2	3	**106**
US Domestic Line	1	5	1	5	4	1	1	**77**
Dual-Source Bridge	2	3	4	4	5	3	2	**91**

D.2 The Operations perspective

Their weighting (their own order): Execution feasibility given bandwidth constraints ×7 · Lead time credibility within the two-quarter window ×6 · Concentration risk reduction ×5 · Customer compliance manageability ×4 · Speed to value ×3 · Capital efficiency and financial model robustness ×2 · Tariff and regulatory durability ×1

Option	Execution fea…	Lead time cre…	Concentration…	Customer comp…	Speed to value	Capital effic…	Tariff and re…	Their total
Stay and Harden	5	5	1	2	5	4	2	**103**
Mexico Nearshore	3	2	3	4	2	3	3	**79**
US Domestic Line	1	1	4	5	1	2	5	**65**

Option	Execution fea…	Lead time cre…	Concentration…	Customer comp…	Speed to value	Capital effic…	Tariff and re…	Their total
Dual-Source Bridge	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	**82**

D.3 The Sales perspective

Their weighting (their own order): Lead time credibility within the two-quarter window ×7 · Speed to value ×6 · Tariff and regulatory durability ×5 · Customer compliance manageability ×4 · Execution feasibility given bandwidth constraints ×3 · Concentration risk reduction ×2 · Capital efficiency and financial model robustness ×1

Option	Lead time cre…	Speed to value	Tariff and re…	Customer comp…	Execution fea…	Concentration…	Capital effic…	Their total
Stay and Harden	1	4	1	2	4	1	4	**62**
Mexico Nearshore	3	2	2	3	2	3	3	**70**
US Domestic Line	5	1	5	5	3	3	2	**103**
Dual-Source Bridge	3	3	3	3	2	4	2	**82**

D.4 The Legal & Trade perspective

Their weighting (their own order): Tariff and regulatory durability ×7 · Customer compliance manageability ×6 · Execution feasibility given bandwidth constraints ×5 · Lead time credibility within the two-quarter window ×4 · Speed to value ×3 · Capital efficiency and financial model robustness ×2 · Concentration risk reduction ×1

Option	Tariff and re…	Customer comp…	Execution fea…	Lead time cre…	Speed to value	Capital effic…	Concentration…	Their total
Stay and Harden	1	2	5	4	5	4	1	**84**
Mexico Nearshore	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	**80**
US Domestic Line	4	5	2	1	1	2	4	**83**
Dual-Source Bridge	5	3	4	3	2	2	5	**100**

D.5 The People perspective

Their weighting (their own order): Execution feasibility given bandwidth constraints ×7 · Lead time credibility within the two-quarter window ×6 · Concentration risk reduction ×5 · Speed to value ×4 · Customer compliance manageability ×3 · Capital efficiency and financial model robustness ×2 · Tariff and regulatory durability ×1

Option	Execution fea…	Lead time cre…	Concentration…	Speed to value	Customer comp…	Capital effic…	Tariff and re…	Their total
Stay and Harden	4	4	1	4	3	4	2	**92**
Mexico Nearshore	4	4	2	4	4	3	3	**99**
US Domestic Line	2	2	3	2	5	2	5	**73**
Dual-Source Bridge	2	2	5	3	4	2	4	**83**